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I
T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    n Doha, Qatar the government of the United States conducted successive 
rounds of negotiations with a non-State entity, the Islamic Emirate of Af-
ghanistan (more commonly known as the Taliban) over the future of a State 
that was not present—the government of Afghanistan. The aim of these ne-
gotiations was to achieve an agreement enabling a great power to claim suc-
cess and draw down forces, reminiscent of the 1988 Geneva talks by which 
the forces of the Soviet Union withdrew from the country. 
Taliban attacks continued and negotiations were suspended. At this writ-
ing, the status of the talks and U.S. force posture are unclear. Regardless, the 
United States will retain a security interest in Afghanistan and the region. 
Indeed, U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is inevitable, but there will be 
choices about strategy. In 1952, the U.S. Naval War College convened a lec-
ture series devoted to strategy. On March 20, the lecturer was Harold D. 
Lasswell, an architect of the New Haven School of Jurisprudence.1 Lasswell 
observed, “The aim of strategy is to maximize the realization of the goal 
values of the body politic.”2 This article proposes that law is among the avail-
able strategic instruments to advance goal values common to the United 
States, Afghanistan, and the world community. 
 
II. GENEVA TO DOHA 
 
The Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland was built to serve as headquar-
ters of the League of Nations. On April 14, 1988, it was the venue for nego-
tiations leading to an agreement under which the Soviet Union would leave 
Afghanistan after a ten-year war. These so-called “proximity talks” were fa-
cilitated by Diego Cordovez, a personal representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General, who acted as go-between in discussions conducted in Kabul and 
                                                                                                                      
1. For an overview of the New Haven School, see W. Michael Reisman, The View from 
the New Haven School of International Law, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (1992). For a detailed explanation of the School, see HAROLD 
D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992). 
2. Harold D. Lasswell, Political Factors in the Formulation of Strategy, 4 U.S. NAVAL WAR 
COLLEGE INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS 49, 63–64 (1952). 
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Islamabad with the Soviet-backed regime.3 The Afghan resistance, known as 
the mujahidin,4 was excluded from the negotiations. 
The resulting accords consisted of four instruments. The first was a Bi-
lateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Re-
public of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on 
Non-Interference and Non-Intervention.5 Provisions of this treaty were de-
signed to hamstring the mujahidin. For example, Article II(8), stated: 
 
to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruit-
ment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activ-
ities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mer-
cenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accord-
ingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and 
transit of such mercenaries.6 
 
Likewise, Article II(11) disallowed “any assistance to or use of or tolerance 
of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High 
Contracting Party.”7 Finally, Article II(12) provided: 
 
                                                                                                                      
3. See Adam Roberts, Afghanistan and International Security, 85 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 13, 84 (2009); SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES, AMERICA’S WAR IN 
AFGHANISTAN 36 (2009). 
4. Mujahidin is the plural form of the word “mujahid,” which means “one who engages 
in jihad.” Mujahidin, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUDIES ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstud-
ies.com/article/opr/t125/e1593 (citing JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
ISLAM (2004)) (“The term became well known in the West in the early 1980s as the Afghan 
mujahidin battled against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.”). It is important to note, 
however, that jihad does not equate to armed struggle. As Esposito states, “Generally refer-
ring to an endeavor toward a praiseworthy aim, the term jihad has many meanings,” and that 
while “often translated as ‘holy war’” in the West, armed struggle is only one of four types 
of jihad. See Jihad, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUDIES ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstud-
ies.com/article/opr/t243/e175 (citing 2 THE ISLAMIC WORLD: PAST AND PRESENT (John 
L. Esposito ed., 2004)). 
5. Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and 
Non-Intervention, Afg.-Pak., Apr. 14, 1988; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 
Apr. 14, 1988 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil, annex I at 3, U.N. Doc. S/19834 (Apr. 26, 1988) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General 
Letter]. 
6. Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and 
Non-Intervention, supra note 5, art. II(8). 
7. Id. art. II(11). 
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to prevent within its territory the presence, harboring, in camps and bases 
or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of indi-
viduals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creat-
ing subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Con-
tracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and 
the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals 
and groups.8 
 
The second instrument was a Declaration on International Guarantees.9 
The parties were the Soviet Union and the United States. The signatories 
undertook 
 
to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the 
internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral Agree-
ment between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Inter-
ference and Non-Intervention.10 
 
The third instrument was a Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of 
Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return 
of Refugees.11 It provided that all Afghan refugees temporarily present in the 
territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity 
to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements 
and conditions set out in the present agreement.12 The fourth instrument was 
an Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation 
relating to Afghanistan.13 It was signed by the Kabul regime and the govern-
ment of Pakistan, and in witness, the representatives of the States-Guaran-
tors, the Soviet Union and United States. It provided: 
 
                                                                                                                      
8. Id. art. II(12). 
9. Declaration on International Guarantees, U.S.S.R.-U.S., Apr. 14, 1988; see U.N. Sec-
retary-General Letter, supra note 5, annex I, at 6. 
10. U.N. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 5, annex I, at 1. 
11. Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees, Afg.-Pak., Apr. 14, 1988; see U.N. Secre-
tary-General Letter, supra note 5, annex I, at 7. 
12. U.N. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 5, annex I, at 7. 
13. Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees, supra note 11, at 10. 
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In accordance with the timeframe agreed upon between the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a 
phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of 
entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn 
by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed 
within nine months.14 
 
In the fourth instrument, the U.S. Secretary of State transmitted to the 
U.N. Secretary-General the following statement: 
 
The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this re-
gard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union that the U.S. retains 
the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military 
assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise re-
straint in providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
similarly will exercise restraint.15 
 
This last instrument was an escape clause. For the Soviet Union, the Ge-
neva Accords were a convenient myth, a mask for an “honorable” disen-
gagement.16 The Accords also signaled continued support to clients within 
Afghanistan as long they acted in the interest of the Great Powers. Critically, 
they did not address internal political arrangements. No strategy was in place, 
nor apparently, was any contemplated. The consequence was a power vac-
uum that internal armed groups and external regional powers would enter. 
Several years of civil war ensued, paving the way for the Taliban.17 
More than thirty years after the Geneva Accords, U.S. representatives 
were in Doha negotiating an end to another Afghan war.18 According to the 
                                                                                                                      
14. Declaration on International Guarantees (Afghanistan Settlement) U.S. Statement, 
art. (2). 
15. G.R. BERRIDGE, RETURN TO THE UN: UN DIPLOMACY IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS 
154 (1991). 
16. “Little at Geneva was devoted to finding transitional political arrangements that 
would reduce subsequent risks of deadly civil strife throughout Afghanistan without impair-
ing the unfolding of self-determination.” Richard Falk, The Afghan Settlement and the Future of 
World Politics, in THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN 142, 157 (Amin Saikal & 
William Maley eds., 1989). 
17. Olivier Roy presciently wrote, “the seed for a civil war among the mujaheddin have 
been sown. Olivier Roy, From Victory to Defeat in Afghanistan, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 7, 
1989. 
18. According to longstanding Afghan analyst and journalist Peter Jouvenal,  
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U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Dr. Zalmay Kha-
lizad, “We would like to leave a very positive legacy here . . . we are not 
cutting and running. We are not looking for a withdrawal agreement. We are 
looking for a peace agreement. And we’re looking for a long-term relation-
ship and partnership with Afghanistan.”19 The talks were a vehicle to reduce 
the U.S. military presence. Meanwhile Afghans worried that compassion fa-
tigue has set in and that the West has an exit strategy.20 Their collective 
memory is a longue durée. 
 
III. A LONGUE DURÉE 
 
The French historian Fernand Braudel coined the term longue durée, defining 
it as “the history of long, even very long, duration in contrast with episodic 
time.”21 The longue durée resides in the Afghan collective memory as percep-
tions and interpretations of events that are passed down and remembered.22 
This collective mindset is the setting (the deep context) for strategy, devel-
opment, and constitutive processes in Afghanistan.23 
                                                                                                                      
The Qatar talks are a mirage. No one represents the Taliban. They are as divided as every 
other Afghan group. The Qatar element is even more disconnected to the Afghan popula-
tion, as they have been out of Afghanistan for over 15 years, and no longer have the confi-
dence of the Afghans. 
Interview with Peter Jouvenal (June 12, 2019). 
19. Envoy: U.S. Not ‘Cutting and Running’ from Afghanistan, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO 
LIBERTY (July 12, 2019), https://www.rferl.org/a/envoy-us-not-cutting-and-running-
from-afghanistan/30051289.html. 
20. Afghans have previously been here. See, e.g., Charles H. Norchi, Opinion, A New 
Start in Afghanistan, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 13, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/ 
10/13/opinion/a-new-start-in-afghanistan.html (arguing that an Afghan election must not 
be an exit strategy). 
21. FERNAND BRAUDEL, ON HISTORY 25 (Sarah Matthews trans., 1980). 
22. Collective memory is “the living bond of generations,” a depository of traditions. 
It is an accumulation of national experiences and events, as well as society’s efforts to revise 
and redefine those events and experiences. Individuals living within a particular culture have 
fixed in their memories, facts and particular attitudes and ways of thinking derived from the 
past. Personal “remembrances will simply be a reconstruction of the past, achieved with 
data borrowed from the present.” MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 69 
(Lewis A. Coser trans. & ed., University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
23. Louis Dupree explains that episodes across events of long duration from pre-his-
toric times to the current era are key to understanding Afghans. LOUIS DUPREE, AFGHAN-
ISTAN (1980). 
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The arrival of Alexander the Great set the pattern.24 In Afghanistan, in-
vading armies tended to stay awhile, destroy, and leave a mark that would 
endure until the next invader. Alexander liberated Greek colonists from Per-
sian rule and fought the Bactrians of Afghanistan in 326–23 BCE.25 As one 
historian notes, “Alexander faced the same dilemma as modern tacticians 
whose high-tech hammers have so often pummeled fruitlessly, as was the 
case throughout the Soviet invasion, where ‘fighting Afghans was like nailing 
jelly to a wall; in the end there was just a wall full of bent nails.’”26 By the 
time Alexander reached India, Afghanistan had legal codes and prescriptions 
that were applied by his designated satraps (governor or local leader).27 At the 
time of Alexander’s death, the Hindu Kush Mountains separated two Greek 
kingdoms, the Bactrian to its north and the Indo-Greek to its south.28 
From 269–32 BCE, the Mauryan Emperor Ashoka reigned and brought 
Buddhism with its associated norms to Afghanistan.29 By the first century 
CE, the Kushans exerted control from the Central Asian steppes south into 
India and west to the Persian plateau. Gandahara, near present day Kabul, 
became the seat of government and a center of literary and artistic creativ-
ity.30 During the second Kushan dynasty, the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan were 
built.31 By the twelfth century CE, Turkish dynasties controlled Afghanistan, 
                                                                                                                      
24. See FRANK L. HOLT, INTO THE LAND OF BONES, ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN AF-
GHANISTAN (2005); GUY MACLEAN ROGERS, ALEXANDER: THE AMBIGUITY OF GREAT-
NESS (2004). 
25. “Greek colonists in Asia did not wish to be liberated and resisted [Alexander] 
fiercely.” DUPREE, supra note 23, at 274. 
26. HOLT, supra note 24 at 67. 
27. As Jawaharlal Nehru wrote, “Alexander entered India through the Khyber Pass in 
the northwest and via Taxila, which lies a little north of Rawalpindi. Even now you can see 
the ruins of this ancient city.” JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, GLIMPSES OF WORLD HISTORY 48 
(1942). 
28. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 285. Following a mutiny of his troops, Alexander then 
turned his army toward Babylon where he died. See W. W. TARN, THE GREEKS IN BACTRIA 
AND INDIA (1951). 
29. VINCENT A. SMITH, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF INDIA 117–42 (1958); DUPREE, su-
pra, note 23, at 285. 
30. WILLIAM MCGOVERN, THE EARLY EMPIRES OF CENTRAL ASIA 251 (1939). 
31. See NANCY HATCH DUPREE, AN HISTORICAL GUIDE TO AFGHANISTAN 154 (1970) 
The Colossal Buddhas of Bamiyan must be set against the back drop of the fabulous era 
which created them. Rome, rich and expanding lay to the west. China, ruled with brilliance 
by the Han Dynasty, lay to the east. India, source of the jewels and spices coveted by all, lay 
to the south. The Silk Route connected these diverse capitals of luxury and, mid-way, the 
Kushan King Kanishka gained wealth and power; and the Afghan area prospered. Luxury 
laden caravans plodded back and forth along the northern plains to the great transshipment 
depots of Balkh and Tashkurghan, where some turned south to cross the Hindu Kush. Half 
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Persia (present day Iran), and north India (present day Pakistan).32 Then 
Genghis Khan swept across the Central Asian steppes destroying the civili-
zations of the thirteenth century and scattering the Turks. Great Afghan cit-
ies such as Balkh, Herat, Ghazni, and Bamiyan were destroyed entirely. 
Next came the Moghuls who ruled until 1707.33 They gave way to invad-
ing Uzbeks and ultimately Pashtuns who by 1648 held large areas of southern 
Afghanistan.34 Two major Pashtun tribes became intense rivals: the Abdalis 
(who later became Durranis) and the Gilzais. Nadir Shah, a Turkman with a 
large Persian army, exerted control over Afghan cities.35 In 1736, he took 
Kandahar allowing the Abdalis to resettle there and exiled the Gilzais to 
Khurasan, thus determining the current settlements of Pashtun tribes in 
southcentral and western Afghanistan.36 He attacked the Moghul Court in 
Delhi and carried the Peacock Throne of Shah Jahan and the crown Moghul 
jewels, including the Koh-i-Nur diamond, back to Afghanistan.37 
Afghanistan became de facto Pashtun and customary Pushtunwali law 
governed. The centers of power were the Abdali tribe of Kandahar and the 
Gilzai of Herat.38 But there was no leader until a jirga39 chose Ahmad Shah 
Durrani.40 The Durrani empire endured from 1747 to 1793 and stretched 
from Central Asia south to Delhi and from the Arabian Sea to Kashmir.41 
In 1770, the Amir of Bokhara, Murad Beg, presented Ahmad Shah Dur-
rani with a kherqa or a cloak worn by the Prophet Mohammad.42 Durrani had 
a mosque constructed in Kandahar to protect the kherqa. By 1772, Durrani 
                                                                                                                      
way through this arduous mountain trek they stopped to rest in the valley of Bamiyan where 
a busy, bustling caravanserai stood at the entrance of the Foladi Valley. 
32. See DUPREE, supra note 23, at 312–41. 
33. SMITH, supra note 29, at 320–62. 
34. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 319. 
35. Id. at 330. 
36. Id. 
37. The Koh-i-Nur diamond was later carried off to the Punjab in India and then to 
Britain where it is among the Crown Jewels. See id. at 331. 
38. See AMIN SAIKAL, MODERN AFGHANISTAN: A HISTORY OF STRUGGLE AND SUR-
VIVAL 18 (2012) (noting the phrase “from tribal confederacy to national coalescence”). 
39. A Jirga is a longstanding instrument of Afghan governance. Jirga are authoritative 
and prescriptions typically backed by effective power and are, hence, law. 
40. See GUL GHUBAR, AHMAD SHAH BABA-YI-AFGHAN (1943). 
41. GEORGE MACMUNN, AFGHANISTAN FROM DARIUES TO AMANULLAH 52–59 
(1929). 
42. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 339. Eventually the cloak would play a critical role in the 
rise of Mullah Omar as “commander of the faithful” and Taliban leader. See AHMED RA-
SHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN SOUTH ASIA 42 (20002). 
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was suffering from face cancer that forced him to wear an artificial silver 
nose.43 He died the same year,44 and soon thereafter, the Russians and the 
British moved on Afghanistan in a pattern that would continue into the 
twenty-first century: external players sought a buffer to maximize power and 
protect territory. 
By the eighteenth century, much of the world was comprised of States, 
while Afghanistan was a loose network of autonomous tribes under the rule 
of emirs. The “land of the Afghan” was a territory in which various actors 
employed violence in the pursuit of power. As the armies of the Czar moved 
south, London concluded that the Russian advance could only be thwarted 
by “forward policies,” which meant getting there first, using common inter-
ests to build tribal alliances, and creating a territorial buffer.45 This phase of 
history became known as the “Great Game,” a phrase coined by Captain 
Arthur Conolly before he was executed by Bokharan tribesmen in 184246 and 
immortalized by Rudyard Kipling in his poem Kim.47 
Early Great Game intrigues involved England and France.48 But, by the 
early 1800s, the Russians were at the gates of Herat. The empire of the Czar 
was expanding.49 This alarmed the British who viewed Herat, the provincial 
                                                                                                                      
43. G. SINGH, AHMAD SHAH DURRANI: FATHER OF MODERN AFGHANISTAN 326 
(1959). 
44. Id. 
45. Within his memoir, in a chapter entitled “Kabul Intrigues,” Bruce wrote: 
The arrangements we had concluded with the Waziris (an Afghan tribe) for the opening up 
and pacification of the country continued to progress satisfactorily . . . and should another 
frontier war with Afghanistan or Russia arise, it is then that the value of the position for 
dealing with these tribes will be fully realized and appreciated. 
RICHARD ISSAQ BRUCE, THE FORWARD POLICY 285 (1900). 
46. PETER HOPKIRK, THE GREAT GAME: THE STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE IN CENTRAL 
ASIA 1 (1992). 
47. “Now I shall go far and far into the North, playing the Great Game.” RUDYARD 
KIPLING, KIM 203 (1901). But see B.D. HOPKINS, THE MAKING OF MODERN AFGHANI-
STAN 34 (2012), for an account of the Great Game as a myth. 
48. “In the year 1808 when . . . it appeared as if the French were to carry the war into 
Asia, it was thought expedient by the British government in India to send a mission to the 
King of Cabaul.” 1 MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, ACCOUNT OF THE KINGDOM OF CAU-
BUL, AND ITS DEPENDENCIES, IN PERSIA, TARTARY, AND INDIA 1 (London, Richard Bent-
ley 1842). French agents were active throughout Persia and were attempting to make inroads 
in Kabul. Napoleon was seeking an alliance between France, Persia, and Afghanistan. But 
by comparison with Russia, the French threat was exaggerated. See HOPKIRK, supra note 46; 
see also PATRICK MACRORY, KABUL CATASTROPHE: THE RETREAT OF 1842 (1986). 
49. See, e.g., KARL E. MEYER & SHAREEN BLAIR BRYCE, TOURNAMENT OF SHADOWS 
(1999). 
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capital of Western Afghanistan on Persia’s westernmost edge, as the gateway 
to India. Mohammed, Shah of Persia, laid siege to the city with Russian sup-
port. Russia now cast a shadow over Central Asia and loomed over British 
interests in India. 50 
The 1838 “Simla Manifesto” signaled British intentions toward Afghan-
istan: invade the territory and restore Soojah as Shah.51 Further, Governor-
General Macnaghten published a codicil stating, “we will continue to prose-
cute with vigour the measures which have been announced, with a view to 
the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the eastern provinces of 
Afghanistan and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes 
of aggression upon our north-west frontier.”52 This would entail amassing 
an “Army of the Indus” comprising British Company, Sikh, and Bengal 
troops, but the key measure signaled in the Manifesto was to place the un-
popular Soojah on the throne.53 
Britain was a “great civilizing power”54 and by civilizing Afghan tribes 
and identifying their interests with those of England, India could be de-
                                                                                                                      
50. “Herat is called the gate of India because through it, and through it alone, the valleys 
can be entered which lead to the only vulnerable parts of India.” CHARLES MARVIN, THE 
RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT 100 (London & New York, Frederick Warne & Co. 
1885). 
51. TAMIN ANSARY, GAMES WITHOUT RULES: THE OFTEN INTERRUPTED HISTORY 
OF AFGHANISTAN 45 (2012). Soojah was also referred to as Emir Shuja. See DUPREE, supra 
note 23, at 376. 
52. MACRORY, supra note 48, at 81. 
53. On October 1, 1838, a “Declaration on the Part of the Right Honourable Gover-
nor-General of India,” also known as the “Simla Manifesto” was published. It was written 
by Governor-General Macnaghten and read in part, 
His Majesty Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk will enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops, 
and will be supported against foreign interference and fractious opposition by a British army 
. . . and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of 
Afghanistan established, the British army will withdraw. 
Id. at 80; see also ABDUL HAKIM TABIBI, AFGHANISTAN: A NATION IN LOVE WITH FREEDOM 
114–18 (1985); HENRY MARION DURAND, THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR AND ITS CAUSES 66–
82 (London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1879). 
54. Lord Roberts observed in an influential speech to the House of Lords in 1898: 
I can only venture to express my firm conviction that, whatever may be the cost of the 
measures I propose, the cost, to say nothing of the danger to the Empire, will be definitely 
greater if we allow matters to drift until we are obliged, in order to resist aggression in 
Afghanistan, to hurriedly mobilize a sufficient force to subdue the hostile tribes through 
whose country we should have to pass before we could reach those strategical positions 
which it is essential we should be able to occupy without delay if we do not intend India—
that brightest jewel in Great Britain’s Crown—to pass out of our safe keeping. 
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fended against Russia. Hence, the forward policy was “the policy of endeav-
oring to extend our influence over, and establish law and order on that part 
of the Border where anarchy, murder, and robbery up to the present time 
have reigned supreme.”55 A chronicler of the period noted, 
 
an active forward policy . . . involved two suppositions, and also a deep-
seated economic problem. Those points were the certitude that Shah Shu-
jah was sufficiently acceptable to the Afghan people for his restoration to 
produce the effect desired . . . . The economic problem was this: Were the 
resources of the army in India in stores and transport sufficient? Could the 
army be maintained so far from its bases . . . Was it adequate for the entirely 
novel and distant undertaking?56 
 
The policy, as applied, was deeply flawed. 
Mohammad Akbar Khan, the son of Ahmad Shah who earlier had been 
deposed by the British, pretended to quell a growing insurrection. Previously, 
he watched Sir William Macnaghten be hacked to death.57 As the population 
became intensely hostile to the British presence, a withdrawal was planned. 
Four-thousand British troops and 12,000 followers, wives, and children de-
parted Kabul after Christmas in 1841.58 The column was relentlessly attacked 
while retreating. At the fortress of Jalalabad near India, rather than the re-
treating Army of the Indus, the British garrison saw a lone horseman riding 
up the Kabul-Jalalabad Road. The date was January 13, 1842, the last rem-
nant of an army, Surgeon Brydon, had arrived in Jalalabad.59Afghan tribes-
men had briefly slowed the expansion of British power.60 
A culture of political violence continued. On February 20, 1919, Afghan-
istan’s Amir Habibullah was assassinated and succeeded by his youngest son, 
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Amanullah, who proclaimed the independence of Afghanistan.61 Afghan 
forces in the Khyber Pass were repulsed by the British and a peace treaty was 
concluded at Rawalpindi in August 1919.62 The treaty recognized the Durand 
Line Agreement separating Afghanistan and India (later Pakistan).63 But 
much of India’s North West Frontier, including the city of Peshawar and the 
tribal agencies, was traditional Pashtun territory. Tribes on each side of the 
Durand Line shared a common ethnic identity and looked to Peshawar as 
their capital. At the time of Indo-Pakistani partition, Kabul demanded the 
Pashtun areas be given independence rather than a choice between India and 
Pakistan.64 What became known as the Pashtunistan issue has never been 
fully resolved.65 Indeed, even today, the plaza in front of the presidential 
palace in Kabul retains the name Pashtunistan Square. 
Amanullah undertook extensive modernization programs, improving the 
judiciary and government administration. The first constitution of Afghani-
stan was promulgated in 1923.66 A system of courts was established and sec-
ular law codes were drafted. Following a visit to Europe, Amanullah an-
nounced reforms directed against traditional social customs, including the 
wearing of the veil. In the autumn of 1928, tribal uprisings began in eastern 
Afghanistan. Kabul was occupied in January 1929, by a brigand who pro-
claimed himself Habibullah II.67 After unsuccessful efforts to reclaim power, 
Amanullah fled to India and then Europe.68 
Amanullah was replaced by Nadir Shah who was assassinated in 1933 
and succeeded by his only son, Zahir Shah.69 Good relations were established 
with Britain and the Soviet Union, as well as with predominantly Muslim 
countries, especially Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Attempts to form close links 
with the United States generated little success but important connections 
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were made with Germany. During the Second World War, Afghanistan re-
mained neutral.70 
In 1947, British rule ended in India. Afghanistan’s role as a balance 
among powers continued although the country increasingly leaned towards 
the Soviet Union. In turn, the Soviet Union supported Afghanistan’s posi-
tion on the question of the tribal lands in the North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) of the new Pakistan State. Kabul contended that Pashtun tribesmen 
should be given the choice of joining Pakistan or forming an independent 
Pashtunistan.71 This led to strained relations between Afghanistan and Paki-
stan and hindered Afghanistan’s transit trade through Pakistan. 
In September 1953, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud was replaced by Sar-
dar Muhammed Daud Khan.72 His regime pressed for large-scale State-di-
rected economic development.73 In December 1955, Soviet leaders Nikolay 
Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev visited Kabul and declared support for Af-
ghanistan’s position on Pashtunistan.74 The Soviet Union provided large-
scale economic aid and the United States provided some aid as well.75 Daud 
obtained military assistance, arms, and training facilities from the Soviet Un-
ion and greatly strengthened the army. He also introduced reforms to im-
prove the status of women, and in 1959, reformists launched a campaign 
protesting the wearing of the veil, generating considerable opposition from 
tribal and conservative religious leaders.76 
 Daud pressed more strongly for Pashtunistan. He denounced the 1921 
Anglo-Afghan treaty that had endorsed the Durand Line and summoned a 
Loya Jirga to declare support of Pashtunistan.77 Afghan-Pakistan relations de-
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teriorated and Afghan troops entered Pakistan tribal territory. In 1961, dip-
lomatic relations were broken with Pakistan and the border sealed.78 Afghan-
istan was obliged to make arrangements with the Soviet Union for transit 
facilities for exports. When Daud abruptly resigned, King Zahir Shah ap-
pointed Dr. Mohammad Yousuff as Prime Minister.79 On March 28, 1963, 
the King appointed a committee to draft a new constitution, which was pre-
sented to a Loya Jirga in September 1964, proclaiming, “Afghanistan is a con-
stitutional monarchy, an independent, unitary and indivisible state.”80 The 
Constitution prescribed that the State would conduct its religious rituals ac-
cording to the Islamic Hanafi School and that freedom of worship would be 
guaranteed to non-Muslims.81 The Loya Jirga approved the Constitution and 
a period of stability followed, to which many Afghans in later years would 
look to with nostalgia.82 
In 1973, King Zahir Shah was deposed, a republic declared, and Sardar 
Muhammed Daud Khan returned to Afghanistan as Prime Minister.83 
Daud’s main objective was rapid economic development. He increased taxes 
and sought foreign aid from Western States, Eastern bloc States, Iran, and 
the Arab Gulf States. Daud tightened State control over the economy, na-
tionalized the principal private bank, the Banke Milli Afghan, and instituted 
land reform.84 
In 1975, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression 
was renewed.85 During the latter part of 1977 and in 1978 Daud increased 
his attacks on domestic political opponents of the right and left. 86 On April 
                                                                                                                      
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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27, the commander of military and air force units in the Kabul area staged a 
coup that became known as the Great Saur Revolution.87 Daud, nearly all his 
family, leading ministers, and principal military commanders were killed.88 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) leader Nur Muhammad Ta-
raki became President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister.89 
The 1977 Constitution was abolished, the Republic of Afghanistan was re-
named the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), power was vested 
in a Revolutionary Council, and the PDPA became the only political party. 
The PDPA introduced a five-year plan to reduce rural indebtedness, abolish 
dowries, and redistribute land. The reforms pitted urban Kabul against rural 
Afghanistan and new civil law codes against revered customary legal prac-
tices. A tribal revolt began in the eastern province of Nuristan and armed 
insurrection spread. 
The regime grew dependent on Soviet aid. The Afghan national flag was 
changed from black, red, and Islamic green to an all-red design similar to the 
flags of the Soviet Republics throughout Central Asia. During the winter of 
1978, guerrilla warfare erupted sporadically in the countryside. The army was 
beset by defections. Soviet military advisors and civilians became integral to 
the functioning of ministries. A resistance emerged and soon established po-
litical organizations across the Khyber Pass in Peshawar, Pakistan. 
In February 1979, U.S. Ambassador Adolph “Spike” Dubs was killed in 
a kidnapping incident when Afghan police coached by Soviet advisors as-
saulted the hotel where he was held.90 The event further alienated Washing-
ton from the Taraki regime. The Carter administration cut aid programs and 
withdrew most U.S. personnel.91 By mid-year the regime’s behavior and the 
country’s chaos ended all foreign aid outside of Communist countries. 
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Taraki met with Brezhnev in Moscow and agreed that Amin must be 
removed in a coup. However, a forewarned Amin turned the tables and Ta-
raki was killed instead.92 Now even more strongly in control, Amin urged 
President Zia of Pakistan to seal the border and restrict guerrilla operations. 
However, Amin failed to win over the rebels or to suppress them. And, as 
the flight of refugees from Afghanistan continued,93 new guerrilla groups 
formed among the refugees in Pakistan. Apart from a common devotion to 
Islam, there was little unity.94 The Amin regime was supported by 80,000 
Soviet troops and 1,500 Soviet civilians.95 
In December, Moscow engineered another coup, airlifting thousands of 
troops into Afghanistan. They utilized a network of transportation and com-
munications that Moscow had put in place during the last two decades. In 
mid-month, Amin narrowly escaped assassination. On December 25, Soviet 
troop movements became a major airlift transporting 5,000 soldiers into Ka-
bul.96 Two days later, having secured the city, Soviet forces attacked the 
stronghold to which Amin had retreated.97 By day’s end, fighting ceased and 
Radio Kabul broadcast an announcement by Afghan Soviet puppet Babrak 
Karmal proclaiming an end to the Amin regime and appealing for Soviet 
aid.98 Amin was summarily executed.99 
Four Soviet divisions crossed the Amu Darya River to begin garrisoning 
the major Afghan towns.100 On April 21, a constitution was adopted by the 
Revolutionary Council outlining basic rights, the organs of government, and 
their competences.101 In May, Radio Kabul announced that anti-government 
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demonstrators arrested earlier that month would be tried by the Afghan Rev-
olutionary Courts. Afghans were again subjected to the policies and strate-
gies of outsiders. They became victims of the Brezhnev Doctrine: 
 
When external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the devel-
opment of a given socialist country in the direction of restoration of the 
capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in any coun-
try—a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—
this is no longer merely a problem for that country’s people, but a common 
problem, the concern of all socialist countries.102 
 
Within a month, Red Army forces rose to 85,000, and shortly thereafter to 
105,000.103 The strategy was initially aimed at securing main cities, strategic 
points, and roads. The Soviet presence emboldened the resistance who called 
themselves mujahidin or holy warriors. Mujahidin forces ambushed Soviet 
convoys and government bases before receding into the Afghan hills. The 
Red Army responded. Crops were burned, trails blanketed with anti-person-
nel mines, entire villages razed, and non-combatants killed.104 
Through displacement and flight, close to one-half of the Afghan popu-
lation became refugees. Bombings, torture, executions, and forced displace-
ment rendered the human rights picture increasingly grim. In turn, the muja-
hidin resistance grew. By mid-1980, the resistance controlled nearly eighty 
percent of the countryside while the Karmal Regime held the cities.105 
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Although poorly developed and articulated, the doctrine of the Afghan re-
sistance movement hewed to the traditional tenets of partisan warfare. Be-
cause the physical expulsion of Soviet forces was beyond its means, the 
resistance instead sought to conduct guerilla operations of a scale and in-
tensity that could inflict as high a price as possible on Soviet forces and 
could also be sustained indefinitely.106 
 
The Afghan struggle against the Soviet presence acquired a religious dimen-
sion. It became a jihad.107 
The unremitting violations of human rights and humanitarian law 
breached legal obligations to which the Soviet Union was bound by treaty.108 
Afghans would live with the resulting human rights and development con-
sequences for years after the Soviet withdrawal. The profound attack on hu-
man rights and Afghan culture caused the country to largely disintegrate be-
fore being captured by an Islamic fundamentalist movement and becoming 
host to al Qaeda, a development that would have transnational effects. 
As the population suffered under withering attacks, the mujahidin 
achieved battlefield successes with the support of an U.S. covert aid pro-
gram. In 1988, Kremlin elites concluded that the costs were too high and cut 
its losses. Soviet troops withdrew in 1989. The Soviet war was a period of 
human dignity under assault that is engrained in the collective Afghan 
memory. The period has been very well chronicled.109 
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In 1988, the President of the Afghan Interim Government, Ahmed Shah, 
told this author, “Our hope is that America will not wash its hands of Af-
ghanistan.”110 It was becoming clear to moderate Afghans that Washington 
was losing interest and consequently giving little thought to which resistance 
organizations were benefiting from the massive inflow of arms. The bulk of 
those decisions were left to Pakistani intelligence.111 This view colored the 
British disentanglement from Afghanistan years earlier.112 
When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, then President Najibullah dug in 
until 1992 when the mujahidin took Kabul.113 The city was captured by Tajik 
leader Burhanuddin Rabbani and Commander Ahmad Shah Massood with 
the support of Uzbek forces led by General Rashid Dostum.114 The Pashtun 
parties based in Peshawar and their military organizations were largely ab-
sent. For the previous three hundred years, Pashtuns had controlled the cap-
ital. Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun fundamentalist who had been well 
armed by Pakistan and the United States, pummeled the city. This open eth-
nic wound would eventually play to the Taliban base.115 
The Geneva Accords had paved the way for chaos, which the Taliban 
exploited to justify the imposition of a rigid sixteenth-century brand of Islam 
previously unknown to most of the Afghan population.116 Girls were sent 
home from schools, the university was shut down, and female doctors were 
ordered out of the hospital.117 There were cases of women needing medical 
treatment being turned away from the hospital and men were ordered to 
grow beards. Anything deemed un-Islamic was prohibited and punished. 
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Taliban leaders were largely uneducated in matters of Islam or government 
and religion became a convenient mask for exercising power.118 
In an advanced digital and globally connected era, it was difficult to com-
prehend that expression, education, and decisionmaking across an entire na-
tion could be squelched. The Taliban emerged in the mid- to late-1990s, a 
period marked by the Internet, email, and interactive CD ROMs. Yet these 
features were partial contours of the times. Taliban Islam, which brokered 
no discussion or debate and claimed a level of purity and sacrifice, appealed 
to young zealots and the newly radicalized. The Taliban opposed modern-
ism, progress, culture, science, and economic development.119 
On September 11, 2001 a coordinated attack, using four hijacked pas-
senger airliners brought down the World Trade Center twin towers in New 
York and destroyed a wing of the Pentagon building. A fourth plane on the 
way to Washington crashed in Pennsylvania. The death toll of nearly 3,000 
people exceeded that of the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor.120 
Operation Enduring Freedom removed the Taliban regime and a new 
chapter in Afghanistan’s national constitutive process opened with the Bonn 
Agreement.121 The Bonn Agreement committed the Transitional Govern-
ment to an interim legal framework based on the Constitution of 1964 that 
operated during the time of the King. The Islamic Transitional State of Af-
ghanistan was inaugurated on December 22, 2001.122 The former King Mo-
hammad Zahir Shah returned to Kabul after twenty-nine years of exile in 
Rome, and opened an emergency Loya Jirga on June 9, 2002.123 An assembly 
of 1,500 Afghans streamed into Kabul to select a government, under the 
protection of U.S. and allied troops.124 In December 2003, a subsequent Loya 
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Jirga was convened to serve as the constitutional convention. A preliminary 
draft constitution was completed in the spring of 2003. A marker in a battle 
of conflicting demands, it was debated and revised in meetings continuing 
through the Constitutional Loya Jirga until approved. 
The 2004 Constitution was a laudable text. But would it ever become the 
operational code for the conduct of the government? A newly drafted con-
stitution may be a myth while what people actually do in informal settings is 
the accepted code of operation. The Constitution again codified the Loya 
Jirga, stating, “the Loya Jirga is the highest expression of the will of the peo-
ple of Afghanistan.”125 Where the National Assembly is termed an expres-
sion of the will of the Afghan people, in keeping with tradition, the Loya Jirga 
is the highest expression of that will, authoritative and controlling. 
A subtext in the debate at the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga was over 
who would own Afghanistan’s Constitution. Well-meaning foreigners of-
fered drafting advice and even model texts. This exposed Afghans who were 
working for a draft that reflected international human rights standards to 
criticism. Faruq Wardak, director of the Constitutional Commission said, 
“Western minded people say mullahs are making the constitution, the fun-
damentalist elements say the Americans are making our constitution.”126 
The process appeared to be “imposed constitutionalism” to borrow a 
phrase from Noah Feldman, who writes,  
 
[a]lthough the wholesale imposition of an entire constitutional order is in-
creasingly rare, constitutions are being drafted and adopted in the shadow 
of a gun. In the last decade in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Afghan-
istan, and . . . Iraq, interim or permanent constitutions have been drafted 
under the conditions of de facto or de jure occupation. Each of the cases 
has also seen substantial intervention and pressure imposed from outside 
to produce constitutional outcomes preferred by international actors . . . . 
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Yet there is something theoretically and practically distinctive about im-
posed liberal constitutionalism today: it takes place against a backdrop of 
widespread commitment to democratic self-determination.127 
 
The indigenous commitment may be to a sui generis form of self-determina-
tion and to Western style democracy only as a myth. 
For the next decade, Afghanistan seemed to be in a state of permanent 
reconstruction and became victim to what William Easterly calls the “Cartel 
of Good Intentions.”128 During this period, a massive influx of foreign aid 
poured into the country, but the international development technocracy 
largely dominated these projects while producing local dependency and thus 
self-perpetuating their presence within the country.129 Afghanistan was a faux 
State, a polity whose real power lay in diffuse pockets disconnected from the 
center. A constitution was in place, government ministries buzzed with ac-
tivity, and the government had a seat in the United Nations. Yet warlords 
and their private armies controlled the provinces, engaging in banditry and 
“taxed” commerce. Effective control and authority of the government was 
confined to a narrow space. 
Under President Obama, U.S. troop levels within Afghanistan reached 
an apex of 100,000 in 2010.130 In 2011, Osama Bin Laden was found in Pa-
kistan and killed in a special operations raid that Obama authorized.131 Later 
that year a steady troop draw down began.132 On August 21, 2017, President 
Trump stated the U.S. policy would be an open-ended military commitment 
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128. See William Easterly, The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign 
Aid, 5 JOURNAL OF POLICY REFORM 223 (2002). 
129. See James Bovard, The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY 
ANALYSIS, no. 65, Jan. 31, 1986, at 1, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analy-
sis/continuing-failure-foreign-aid; P. Boone, Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid, 40 EU-
ROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 289 (1996); Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies and 
Growth, 90 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 847 (2000); see generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, 
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES 
IN THE TROPICS (2001). 
130. See OUR LATEST LONGEST WAR: LOSING HEARTS AND MINDS IN AFGHANISTAN 
(Aaron B. O’Connell ed., 2017) (featuring essays by U.S. veterans on history, governance, 
strategy, special operations, and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan). 
131. For a full account of this period, see STEVE COLL, DIRECTORATE S: THE CIA AND 
AMERICA’S SECRET WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (2018). 
132. A Timeline of U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan Since 2001, MILITARY TIMES (July 6, 
2016), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/07/06/a-timeline-of-u-
s-troop-levels-in-afghanistan-since-2001/. 
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to prevent a “vacuum for terrorists.”133 But on December 19, 2018, he or-
dered a withdrawal of 7,000 troops, half of the remaining 14,000.134 For the 
Afghan population, the pendulum swung again from personal insecurity to 
the expectation of violence—the familiar pattern of their longue durée.135 
 
IV. BELOW THE STATE 
 
Since the Peace of Westphalia,136 populations have looked to nation-States 
to satisfy a wide range of needs. Operating in a community of similarly or-
ganized units, these territorial political arrangements provided security for 
citizens who were also bases of State power. In return for security, the people 
ceded control and conferred an expectation of authority upon ruling State 
elites. This bargain was a foundation of the State system and formed the 
delicate balance upon which world order turned. But increasingly, weak and 
fragile States have collapsed, piercing their sovereignty. People living within 
their borders were often engulfed by armed conflict and their human rights 
eclipsed. Failed and wobbly States harbored exportable violence and became 
problems for an international system that lacked the institutional capacity to 
address such problems. 
The U.N. Charter did not contemplate the collapse or disintegration of 
a State.137 It presumed effective communication among sovereign govern-
ments and their elites, and a range of action available to the Security Council, 
including provisional measures, sanctions short of force, and coercion. 
These instrumentalities were designed to bring pressure upon a cohesive 
                                                                                                                      
133. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Outlines New Afghanistan War Strat-
egy with Few Details, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
08/21/world/asia/afghanistan-troops-trump.html. 
134. Gordon Lubold & Jessica Donati, Trump Order Big Troop Reduction in Afghanistan, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administra-
tion-is-considering-substantial-afghan-troop-drawdown-11545341452. 
135. See AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS (2010); SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVE-
YARD OF EMPIRES, AMERICA’S WAR IN AFGHANISTAN (2009). 
136. The origin of the modern nation-State system can be traced to 1648 and the Thirty 
Years War that ended with the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck or the Peace of West-
phalia. It has also been argued that that the State system originated with the Concordat of 
Worms in 1122 because the Investiture Struggle established a property right corresponding 
to sovereign territory—“the right of kings to the income from the territory defined by the 
domain of each bishop.” See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Popes, Kings, and Endogenous Institu-
tions: The Concordat of Worms and the Origins of Sovereignty, 2 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, 
no. 2, 2000, at 93. 
137. See U.N. Charter, arts. 1, 2. 
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form of supranational political organization: functioning States. However, 
by the late twentieth century the problem of failing States was becoming an 
urgent challenge.138 With the September 11, 2001 attacks, it was apparent 
that disintegrating and failed States were “threats to the peace” under the 
meaning of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter.139 Since preventing threats to the 
peace is a fundamental purpose of the United Nations,140 the world commu-
nity came to appreciate that addressing this type of threat would require 
strengthening fragile States and reconstructing failed States.141 
The presumed robust character of the sovereign State increasingly con-
vulsed from the conditions of the twenty-first century. Sovereignty was not 
absolute.142 It had been changing to reflect the reality of the world social pro-
cess, yet sovereignty remained an important technique wielded by State elites, 
and it performed a stabilizing international function that was central to main-
taining world public order.143 The old bargain had begun to change from the 
peoples’ ceding of power to the sovereign in return for security, to the peo-
ples’ ceding of power to the sovereign in return for guarantees of rights.144 
                                                                                                                      
138. See Chester Crocker, Engaging Failing States, 82 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Sept.–Oct. 2003, 
at 32. 
139. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
140. Id. art. 1(1). 
141. None of the U.N. institutional machinery effectively helped countries transition 
from war to peace. Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed a Peacebuilding Commission 
as a key U.N. reform based on the recommendations of the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change he had convened. U.N. Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-
General to the General Assembly, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
142. C. Wilfred Jenks’ observation that “Sovereignty is not absolute, but divisible” was 
increasingly apparent. He had observed that this was “inconceivable to the dogmatic school 
of thought” represented by Hobbes’ Leviathan, “which regarded the essence of sovereignty 
as being its absolute quality.” C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL AD-
JUDICATION 499 (1964). 
143. As observed by Judge Alvarez in the Corfu Channel judgment, 
Sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes obligations on them. . . . This notion 
has evolved and we must now adopt a conception of it which will be in harmony with the 
new conditions of social life. We can no longer accept sovereignty as an absolute and indi-
vidual right of every State . . . . The sovereignty of States has now become an institution, an 
international social function of a psychological character, which has to be exercised in accord-
ance with the new international law.  
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (individual opinion 
by Alvarez, J.). 
144. The old myth was giving way to a view of sovereignty based on an international 
legal instrument: “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the govern-
ment.” G. A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21(3) (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
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Where absolute sovereignty was about State security, popular sovereignty is 
about human dignity.145 And a secure State might enhance the rights and 
dignity of the population. But sovereignty, as traditionally conceived, had 
helped solve, or at least significantly improve, a problem of the anarchical 
State system: maintaining order in international relations.146 
For States that were weak and whose territorial integrity was challenged, 
sovereignty was severable.147 Francis Fukuyama wrote, “sovereignty and the 
nation-state, cornerstones of the Westphalian system, have been eroded in 
fact and attacked in principle, because what goes on inside states—in other 
words their internal governance—often matters intensely to other members 
of the international system.”148 Interventions, both humanitarian and strate-
gic-based, resulted in the removal of odious regimes and nation-building pro-
jects that assumed traditional State functions. As one scholar has noted, 
“[t]he state-building practices of international administrations reveal a sov-
ereignty paradox: international administrations compromise a fundamental 
aspect of a political community’s sovereignty by violating its right to self-
governance, but do so with the aim of making it sovereign with regard to the 
relations between state and society.”149 This describes Afghanistan in the year 
2019. Sovereignty is pierced; formal institutions of government are weak; yet 
life below the State goes on. 
                                                                                                                      
145. In his 1999 annual address to the General Assembly, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan stated, 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalization 
and international cooperation. The State is now widely understood to be the servant of its 
people, and not vice versa. . . . [I]t is not the deficiencies of the Charter which have brought 
us to this juncture, but our difficulties in applying its principles to a new era; an era when 
strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no longer do justice to the aspirations of peo-
ples everywhere to attain their fundamental freedoms. 
Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999). 
146. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 53 (1977). 
147. The principle of territorial integrity of States is a central goal of the United Nations. 
See U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 2(7) (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state . . . .”). 
148. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 92 (2004). 
149. “By establishing international administrations and denying self-governance to the 
affected populations, the international community compromises one of the fundamental 
aspects of sovereignty, the norm of self-determination.” DOMINIK ZAUM, THE SOVER-
EIGNTY PARADOX: THE NORMS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL STATEBUILDING 27 
(2007). 
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Through tranquility, violence, and chaos many Afghan communities had 
thrived.150 They drew on common interests animated by social capital and 
shared cultural and religious perspectives. They thrived below the State. As 
Thomas Barfield has observed,  
 
One reason that Afghan society has survived so many years of turmoil has 
been its ability to govern itself at the local level even in the absence of state 
institutions. The international community should take advantage of this 
strength by recognizing that most problems are not solved in the formal 
judicial institutions but rather informally.151  
 
But how should external actors engage a polity and its people in a context 
of conflict and fractured sovereignty? Or, as Michael Reisman asked, “What 
are the strategies available to communities in transition, for their process of 
redefinition, and what role should the international community—an increas-
ingly effective participant in all these sub-communities—take in the pro-
cess?”152 If law is an available strategy, how can it be effectively wielded in 
Afghanistan and advance the goal values of the body politic?153 
 
V. LAW AS STRATEGY 
 
Harold Lasswell delivered the March 20, 1952 U.S. Naval War College lec-
ture on strategy.154 His view of strategy accounted for ends, means, and val-
ues. For Lasswell, “The management of base values to achieve scope values 
is strategy” 155 Values are preferred outcomes—the things people need and 
want. And accumulated values (base) could generate additional values 
                                                                                                                      
150. See RORY STEWART, THE PLACES IN BETWEEN (2004). 
151. Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 60 
MAINE LAW REVIEW 2 (2008). 
152. Theme II Roundtable Communities in Transition: Autonomy, Self-Governance and Independ-
ence, 87 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 248, 249 (1993) (fea-
turing remarks by W. Michael Reisman). 
153. Values, for Lasswell and New Haven School of Jurisprudence, as described in 
Lasswell’s 1952 U.S. Naval War College lecture were terms that described social process 
dynamics: power, wealth, respect, well-being, enlightenment, skill, affection, and rectitude. 
See Lasswell supra note 2, at 53. 
154. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
155. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, 1 JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE 
SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 345 (1992). 
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(scope).156 Law is a strategic instrument because of its value manipulating and 
fulfilling qualities, including the value power.157 
Michael Reisman explains that law in every community is made by a con-
tinuing and comprehensive process of communication.158 This process en-
tails communications directed toward a target audience. Each communica-
tion contains policy content, an authority signal, and a control intention in-
dicated by the communicators.159 In order to know the law, one cannot solely 
rely on formal agreements and other textual statements.160 One must also 
observe habitual behavior. Behavior, which in the beginning might be con-
sidered unlawful, if repeated and tolerated throughout a period, might even-
tually become regarded as lawful. To make the distinction requires appraising 
the flow of behavior and the flow of words. Thus, Myres McDougal states, 
“[T]he term ‘law’ includes reference to both authority, in the sense of com-
munity expectations about the requirements of decision, and control, in the 
sense of actual participation in the making and enforcement of decision.”161 
Legal systems must not be confused with legal rules. In any community, 
rules rest on the surface of the legal system.162 The real dimensions of the 
system are often found in other places. One must come to terms with other 
processes within the culture and the society if one is to truly understand law 
                                                                                                                      
156. Because the number of preferred outcomes is infinite, Lasswell used a workable 
heuristic of eight terms: power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, 
rectitude. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 18 (1971). 
157. Law has been appraised as a strategic instrument under the rubric, “Lawfare,” 
which Charles Dunlap defines “as the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute 
for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., 
Lawfare Today, YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Winter 2008, at 146; see also 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today . . . And Tomorrow, 87 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 
315(2011); Dale Stephens, The Age of Lawfare, 87 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 327 (2011). 
158. See W. Michael Reisman, International Law-Making: A Process of Communication, 75 
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159. Id. at 108. 
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in context.163 A legal system may have more to do with custom or religion, 
or tradition than with what might be considered modern social conven-
tions.164 Unwritten law, emanating from the political process, is an important 
feature of community decisionmaking. This is especially apparent in rural 
settings where customary and formalized councils are both engaged in choice 
making and resource allocation.165 
Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski urged scholars, “not to study how 
human life submits to rules—it simply does not; the real problem is how the 
rules become adapted to life.”166 This exercise in what Clifford Geertz called 
“thick description,”167 or sorting out the various codes of meaning in webs 
of significance, may seem distant from legal method. However, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes observed: 
 
It is perfectly proper to regard and study the law simply as a great anthro-
pological document. It is proper to resort to it to discover what ideals of 
society have been strong enough to reach that final form of expression, or 
what have been the changes in dominant ideals from century to century. It 
is proper to study law as an exercise in the morphology and transformation 
of human ideas.168 
 
Societies and communities possess multiple normative systems. The nor-
mative code relied upon by officials may be a myth system whose reliability 
for guidance will vary. Far more significant is often the unofficial normative 
system that operates as the real operational code.169 As the entrenched nor-
mative system of the populace, the operational code will often prevail over 
a constitution and codified law. Identifying authority and control enables 
                                                                                                                      
163. J.H. Merryman, The Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 
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distinguishing between real law and lex simulata. Or, as Lasswell and McDou-
gal conclude, “The degree to which the technical legal doctrines of a com-
munity represent reality or illusion may in great measure depend upon the 
exact interrelations of formal authority and effective control.”170 This con-
ception of law can be strategically deployed in Afghanistan. 
The text of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan is one element of a 
larger constitutive process whose most enduring dimension is customary de-
cision-making and related practices. Law in Afghanistan has always been a 
mix of the weak law of the State in the form of civil codes and courts, and a 
more robust customary and Islamic law, the latter two legal frameworks fea-
turing more prominently in the daily lives of most Afghans. Since the found-
ing of the independent Afghan State, successive administrations in Kabul 
have sought to impose civil codes upon local communities with centuries-
old authoritative decision-making arrangements. Afghan customary law and 
practices embody resilient micro-legal systems.171 These environments of en-
during normative expectation display the functional equivalents of formal 
law and governance. They operate parallel to the Afghan State and allow 
ordinary people to survive. 
When thinking and operating below the State, it becomes apparent that 
“as total systems, societies differ radically in their patterns of values. The 
differences reside not only in hierarchies or priorities—the ordering of val-
ues according to importance, in some sense—but also in other important 
modes of relationships among values.”172 Regardless of the context, there is 
an important relationship between values, individual decision making, and 
collective community choice. As Talcott Parsons noted,  
 
[t]he values which come to be constitutive of the structure of a societal 
system are . . . the conceptions of the desirable type of society held by the 
members of the society of reference and applied to the particular society 
of which they are members . . . . A value pattern . . . defines a direction of 
choice, and consequent commitment to action.173 
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Perspective, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN VALUES 17 (Milton Rokeach ed., 1979). 
173. Talcott Parsons, On the Concept of Value-Commitments, 38 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 
135, 136 (1968). 
 
 
 
Law as Strategy in Afghanistan Vol. 95 
391 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A key task is to appraise the direction of choice implicit in value aspirations 
in communities and these may be disconnected from the formal State. 
In his Naval War College lecture on strategy, Lasswell described “dis-
tinctive means” and “distinctive effects.”174 A distinctive mean that gener-
ated distinctive effects across Afghanistan was the National Solidarity Pro-
gram (NSP).175 It is a concrete example of deploying law as strategy beneath 
the Afghan State.176 NSP was implemented by the government of Afghani-
stan’s Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) with 
funding from the International Development Association (IDA) of the 
World Bank Group. The program’s goal was to facilitate an inclusive partic-
ipatory process within the community that would result in an equitable com-
munity development plan comprising one or more subprojects that would 
be eligible for funding under both the NSP and other existing programs. The 
longer-term goal was the creation of community institutions that would be-
come the expression of the community’s ability to mobilize, consult, plan, 
finance, implement, and evaluate its own development.177 NSP became a na-
tional program to accumulate value and develop institutional capacity.178 
NSP was designed for a context in which the power of the Afghan cen-
tral government was limited to Kabul and its immediate environs. Outside 
Kabul, the country was controlled by a myriad of major and minor warlords 
who carved out small and sometimes quite large fiefdoms in the political 
vacuum that emerged after the fall of the Taliban. Because the central gov-
ernment was unable to control or neutralize destabilizing elites, it devised 
NSP, in large part, to fill power interstices in the short-run by providing ser-
vices directly to communities. Service delivery was, however, conditioned 
                                                                                                                      
174. Lasswell, supra note 2, at 50. 
175. According to the initiative’s Operational Manual, “NSP promotes a new develop-
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sources during all stages of the project cycle.” See MINISTRY OF RURAL REHABILITATION 
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AFGHANISTAN 98 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2007) 
178. NSP operated in most Afghan provinces and by 2006 covered nearly 20,000 vil-
lages. See NSP OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 175. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2019 
392 
 
 
 
 
 
 
upon fundamental changes in local constitutive processes. Kabul elites saw 
the long-term NSP goal as laying the foundations for improving local gov-
ernance and strengthening democracy by making the process relevant at the 
village level, while also fostering local initiative for sustainable development 
and extending the power of the central government through contact with 
the rural population.179 
NSP was about law and governance as much as development. A key fac-
tor in achieving program goals was universal suffrage of representative Com-
munity Development Councils (CDCs).180 The CDC was established 
through an election, conducted by secret ballot, where each person had one 
vote. Importantly, men and women were eligible to serve on CDCs. The 
CDC members regularly consulted amongst themselves and with the com-
munity about development needs and priorities. They would manage and 
monitor the use of their development resources. While CDCs could contrib-
ute to the empowerment of the poor and to the stability of Afghanistan, they 
could also contribute to violence and instability if they attempted to displace 
traditional customary practices, particularly if done so abruptly. 
The program defined a community as a village of more than 50 families. 
A development council was established for each community and a block 
grant allocated.181 The MMRD contracted with facilitating partners,182 even-
tually covering thirty-two provinces. The role of the facilitating partners op-
erating within the NSP framework was to create an enabling environment 
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through facilitation of inclusive community elections, community planning, 
technical assistance, and timely release of funds, so that communities could 
plan and manage their development projects. In these traditional Afghan 
communities, NSP was crucial to evolving constitutive processes, which was 
important, as community empowerment was a key objective of the program. 
In the conflict-enveloped communities of Afghanistan, certain decisions 
are still made and enforced irrespective of community members’ prefer-
ences. These decisions are made through naked power, often by local com-
manders and warlords. Other decisions—those made by shuras, jirgas, and 
CDCs—are from perspectives of authority. These decisions are made by in-
dividuals who are expected to act in accordance with the fundamental poli-
cies and general expectations of the community. They are achieved through 
established procedures and through accepted structures. The individuals 
who make these decisions, the shura and CDC members, possess sufficient 
influence and community support to put them into operation. These are the 
authoritative decisions of the community and therefore law.183 
CDCs are similar to shuras and jirgas, albeit with an important distinction. 
To the extent practicable, they are gender inclusive. Customary Afghan 
governance structures are patriarchal and based on conservative Islamic 
values. Securing outcomes in the common interest in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere presumes degrees of “normative termination,”184 meaning that as 
older norms fall into disuse, communiites begin to accept newer, often more 
progessive norms. 
The Citizen’s Charter is the successor to NSP.185 It builds on the model 
of community decision-making through councils employing familiar legal 
values. Under the NSP, customary law arrangements evolved and this trend 
can continue under the Citizens’ Charter. However, a much less positive 
outcome is also a possibility: a reversion to Taliban norms and prescriptions. 
 
                                                                                                                      
183. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); see 
also Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 170. 
184. Harold D. Lasswell & Allan R. Holmberg, Toward a General Theory of Directed Value 
Accumulation and Institutional Development, in POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOP-
MENT 354, 378 (Ralph Braibanti ed., 1969) (“Development programs typically entail the 
obsolescence and termination of older norms.”). 
185. CITIZENS’ CHARTER AFGHANISTAN PROJECT, THE WORLD BANK, https://pro-
jects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P160567?lang=en (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2019). 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2019 
394 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. U.S. STRATEGY AND THE WAY OF THE PATHAN186 
 
U.S. engagement in Afghanistan has been a tale of two timeframes—the long 
and the short. U.S. foreign policy is often episodic. It is largely conceived to 
confront immediate problems and resonates when the objectives are clear, 
measurable, and when American might is deployed with a return date. How-
ever, certain challenges, such as Afghanistan, are not susceptible to an epi-
sodic foreign policy approach. Episodes can be significant building blocks 
for a long-term foreign policy when coupled with strategic vision.187 For the 
Great Game British, the Cold War Soviets, and the twenty-first century 
United States, the overriding challenge in Afghanistan was how to align the 
conduct of episodic foreign policy to longue durée problems. 
With collapse of the Doha negotiations, a reorientation to the problem 
and plausible futures for Afghanistan is in order. Will a post-Doha agreement 
bring Afghanistan back to the future by enabling Taliban power?188 Will Af-
ghanistan be a modern State on the outside and an Islamic Emirate on the 
inside? Will a severe interpretation of Islamic law be enforced, reversing 
women’s rights and curtailing “Western” education? In this scenario, a clash 
of values would ensure instability and the probable collapse of the State. 
Present trends already indicate a heightened expectation of violence.189 
                                                                                                                      
186. The British called Pashtuns “Pathans,” a Hindi word they acquired in India. The 
term “Afghan” originally applied only to the Pashtuns. Pashtun customary law is pashtun-
wali, or the way of the pathans. See JAMES W. SPAIN, THE WAY OF THE PATHANS (1962). 
187. See ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, STRATEGIC VISION (2012). 
188. Draft documents that emerged from the Doha talks contain conflicting statements 
across translations in English, Dari, Pashtu, and Urdu. According to one analyst the draft 
Doha Agreement is an “instrument for the enforcement of the Taliban’s shari‘a-based ob-
jectives in Afghanistan.” Tufail Ahmad, The Doha Agreement: Paving the Way for the Taliban’s 
Takeover of Afghanistan and Enforcement of Shari‘a-Based Governance, MEMRI (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.memri.org/reports/doha-agreement-%E2%80%93-paving-way-talibans-take 
over-afghanistan-and-enforcement-sharia-based. 
189. See, e.g., Susannah George, The Past Three Months in Afghanistan Have Been the Deadliest 
for Civilians in a Decade, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/ asia_pacific/past-three-months-in-afghanistan-have-been-the-deadli-
est-for-civilians-in-a-decade/2019/10/17/09bf904e-f054-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story 
.html. Moreover, as Lasswell noted, “The assumption that men will settle their differences 
by fighting reacts powerfully upon the identifications, demands and expectations of human 
beings.” HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 40 (1965). 
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But, there is an alternative future. And as General Mark Milley testified, 
pulling U.S. troops prematurely from Afghanistan would be a “strategic mis-
take.”190 The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy stipulated four vital 
national interests coupled with strategic pillars all guided by “principled 
realism.”191 It declared U.S. vital interests as (1) protecting the homeland, (2) 
promoting American prosperity, (3) preserving peace through strength, and 
(4) advancing American influence.192 It also acknowledged the central role of 
power in international relations, the sovereign State as the sine quo non of 
world order, and the principle of promoting American values globally.193 
Accordingly, it stated, “The United States will promote a development 
model that partners with countries that want progress, consistent with their 
culture, based on free market principles, fair and reciprocal trade, private 
sector activity, and rule of law.”194 Likewise, it stated, “We will continue to 
champion American values and offer encouragement to those struggling for 
human dignity in their societies.”195 
The National Security Strategy declared a long view commitment, 
providing that the United States will “assist fragile states to prevent threats 
to the U.S. homeland.” 196 Specific to Afghanistan, it stated: 
 
We are committed to supporting the Afghan government and security 
forces in their fight against the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, ISIS, and other terrorists. 
                                                                                                                      
190. Lolita C. Baldor & Robert Burns, General: Early Afghanistan Pullout Would Be a Mis-
take, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 11, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/3b24724c72dd49c2 
ba6cab86e7de548c. And as Barnett Rubin pertinently observed,  
Despair about Afghanistan may be intellectually respectable, but we cannot walk away from 
a civil war in a region with new nuclear powers bordering on the world’s major sources of 
energy. And the United States has a special relationship: we paid for many of the weapons 
that have destroyed Afghanistan, and we helped put them in the wrong hands. 
RUBIN, supra note 89, at 26. 
191. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-
Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. “A statutorily mandated document, the NSS explains to the 
American people, U.S. allies and partners, and federal agencies how the President intends 
to put his national security vision into practice on behalf of fellow citizens.” A New National 
Security Strategy for a New Era, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/articles/new-national-security-strategy-new-era/. 
192. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 
191, at 4. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 38  
195. Id.  
196. Id. at 39. 
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We will bolster the fighting strength of the Afghan security forces to con-
vince the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield and to set the 
conditions for diplomatic efforts to achieve enduring peace.197 
 
These statements articulate a long-term strategic vision,198 but in 
Afghanistan, U.S. strategy has tacked to the episodic. 
The United States has enduring interests in Afghanistan—addressing the 
threat of exportable terrorism, State collapse, nuclear weapons, regional 
chaos, the Kashmir flashpoint,199 the China challenge,200 the influence of 
Russia and Iran, the alignment of Chinese and Russian interests, and pro-
moting the dignity and human rights of all Afghans. Indeed, U.S. engage-
ment within Afghanistan is inevitable, yet available resources will be re-
duced.201 In an environment of resource reduction, law properly conceived 
is one available instrument to help achieve these strategic goals. 
Strategy entails pursuing ends and means under various contingencies.202 
One contingency is the inclusion, and influence, of the Taliban in the Gov-
                                                                                                                      
197. Id. at 50. 
198. On the importance of long-term strategic thinking, see BRZEZINSKI, supra note 
187. 
199. Afghans and Sikhs fought over Kashmir in the 1800s. In the late 1980s Afghan 
mujahidin made common cause with Kashmiri guerillas who after 1992 found haven in train-
ing camps of eastern Afghanistan. See B.D. HOPKINS, supra note 47, at 75; DAVID LOYN, IN 
AFGHANISTAN: TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF BRITISH, RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN OCCUPA-
TION 196 (2010). Pakistan and India, each nuclear armed States, have gone to war over 
Kashmir. Further, on August 5, 2019, India terminated the constitutionally protected special 
status of Kashmir and deployed troops to the area. See, e.g., India Revokes Disputed Kashmir’s 
Special Status with Rush Decree, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/ 
news/2019/08/india-abolishes-kashmir-special-status-rush-decree-190805061331958.html . 
200. Afghanistan holds observer status in the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization, which is a vehicle to challenge U.S. influence in Central Asia. China has hosted 
Afghan peace conferences, holds mineral rights in Afghanistan’s Mes Aynak copper mine, 
and provides equipment and training to the Afghan government. Chinese military vehicles 
reportedly operate in the Wakhan corridor. See US Envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad in 
China for Peace Meeting, THE NATION (July 11, 2019), https://www.thena-
tional.ae/world/mena/us-envoy-to-afghanistan-zalmay-khalilzad-in-china-for-peace-meet-
ing -1.884909. 
201. The political and legal environment of the redesigned U.S. mission in Afghanistan 
must account for a range of “expectations held by politically relevant actors.” See W. Michael 
Reisman, International Legal Dynamics and the Design of Feasible Missions: The Case of Afghanistan, 
85 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 59 (2009). 
202. See Lasswell, supra note 2, at 63–64; see also LIDDELL HART, STRATEGY (1954), BER-
NARD BRODIE, STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE (1959); THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY 
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ernment of Afghanistan. The internal struggle will be over values. In his lec-
ture, Lasswell emphasized, “the fundamental importance of relating the ob-
jectives of any special sphere of strategy to the goal values sought by the 
body politic for whom the strategy is formulated.”203 Elsewhere he wrote, 
“Strategies are the management of base values to affect value outcomes.”204 
An understated, and rarely understood success of the U.S. presence in Af-
ghanistan, has been the promotion of values shared by Americans and by 
most Afghans. These values will be challenged and potentially curtailed in 
post-America Afghanistan. The Taliban will have a seat at the governance 
table and the power and influence to shape the direction that the country 
takes following a significant U.S. withdraw. “Power is an indispensable com-
ponent of any effective legal arrangement.”205 This, the Taliban knows. 
But, law as strategy can build capacity. The effective performance of 
country systems—administration, governance, goods and service delivery, a 
suitable regulatory and legal environment for development—depends on ca-
pacity. Rather than focus on services, infrastructure, and capital transfers, 
donor countries and international organizations must define capacity itself 
as the primary objective of all development assistance.206 This requires 
devoting attention to the State while operating below. This proposition is 
supported by experience in Afghanistan, recent and long past. 
A strategy of law for post-America Afghanistan must be conceived (1) 
above the State, (2) at the level of the State, and (3) below the State. The 
strategic objective is to enable what anthropologist Leopold Pospisil called 
“the basic legal function—the exercise of institutionalized social control.” 207 
The strategy must explicitly account for the capacity of people and institu-
tions. Capacity is the ability of people, organizations, and society to manage 
their affairs successfully.208 Capacity includes problem-solving skills and gov-
ernance processes and systems that can be sustained. The goal is to build 
                                                                                                                      
OF CONFLICT (1960); CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 177, 183 (Michael Howard & Peter 
Peret eds. & trans., Princeton University Press, 1989) (1832). 
203. See Lasswell, supra note 2, at 51. 
204. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 26 (1971). 
205. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMIT-
MENT 95 (2013). 
206. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 148, at 82–91. 
207. POSPISIL, supra note 160, at 15. 
208. See DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC 
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE CHALLENGE OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: 
WORKING TOWARDS GOOD PRACTICE (2006). 
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“locally-owned processes of improvement in certain organizational spheres 
even when conditions in the wider system are suboptimal.”209 
Above the State means holding the government of Afghanistan 
accountable to its international human rights obligations. At the level of the 
State, attention must be devoted to the continued promotion of the 
Constitution, secular legal codes, and legal instruction at all Afghan 
university law faculties. 210 There have been calls to revise the Constitution 
that will intensify with Taliban participation in the government. Hence, the 
same attention devoted to drafting the text must be devoted to grounding 
the document so the population accepts it as authoritative. A constitution is 
more process than text.211 It must be accepted as authoritative by the popu-
lation, otherwise it is only a myth. People assume a common responsibility 
to the extent they participate in assenting to the law. The constitutive process 
must take root in the teahouses and mosques.212 The alternative could be the 
fate of Amanullah, who was driven from Kabul when his secular legal codes 
and reforms were rejected. 
Another contingency is the severing of Afghan sovereignty.213 This is 
why life as it unfolds below the State will merit very close attention. 
Community decision-making outcomes will continue to convey authority 
and generate legitimate control. The Taliban will intensely promote their law 
                                                                                                                      
209. Id. at 7. 
210. See Mehdi J. Hakimi & Erik G. Jensen, Rethinking Legal Education in Afghanistan: The 
Law Program at the American University of Afghanistan, 55 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 2 (2019). 
211. As the Roman jurist Papinian wrote, “Lex is a common engagement of the Re-
public.” See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 
50 (1947). 
212. In Afghanistan, formal authority has been minimal and dispersed. Effective con-
trol is spotty and rarely applied from Kabul, the administrative center of the country. See 
Charles H. Norchi, Toward the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Constitutive Process, in BEYOND 
RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN 115 (John Montgomery & Dennis Rondinelli eds., 
2004). 
213. Hersch Lauterpacht concluded, 
sovereignty is not in the nature of an absolute and rigid category, but that, being no more 
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charged with its total or partial exercise. 
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and mobile courts which some communities will accept as authoritaive.214 
But even the most traditional community is complex and operates with mul-
tiple and dynamic value systems. Thus, the ability to appraise unwritten law, 
or custom, will be an indispensable strategic task.215 
The effective deployment of law requires continually clarifying goals, 
constantly appraising trends, identifying and isolating the factors shaping 
those trends, and making realistic projections while considering achievable 
alternatives owing to strategic choices.216 To deploy law as strategy in 
Afghanistan requires recognizing context, conceiving of law beyond rules, 
understanding values,217 building upon authentic operational codes, and 
aligning means (available assets) and ends. The NSP and Citizen’s Charter 
are good models. International development agencies, civil society, legal 
organizations and universities can be good partners. In modern States and 
traditional cultures, “[l]aw is a process of human beings making choices.”218 
That process has been the way of the Pathan across a longue durée. In the 
looming environment of reduced resources, law is a deployable strategy, for 
Afghanistan, the United States, and the greater common interest. 
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